Saturday April 5, 2025

A burnt-out bulletproof Toyota Land Cruiser, part of Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy, is seen loaded onto a flatbed truck after being destroyed by an improvised explosive device (IED) in Mogadishu on March 18, 2025. The president survived the assassination attempt, which officials blamed on al-Shabaab.

Mogadishu (HOL) — The road to Mogadishu runs through shattered towns and makeshift outposts that have changed hands too many times to count. However, Al-Shabaab’s recent offensive in central Somalia is threatening to destabilize the capital, Mogadishu, as Somalia’s overstretched forces struggle to contain a surge in militant attacks, a new report by the Soufan Center warns.

Since February 2025, al-Shabaab has launched a renewed offensive in the Hiraan and Middle Shabelle regions, increasing its rate of attacks by 50 percent compared to 2024, according to conflict data cited in the report, “Between Islamic State and Al-Shabaab: An Embattled Mogadishu?” The group has reclaimed several strategic towns and temporarily overran military installations, including a Somali Armed Forces base.

In January and February, Somali government forces and local fighters repelled two heavy assaults in Beera Yabaal, killing more than 100 militants, according to security sources. The fighting was part of al-Shabaab’s attempt to open a logistical corridor from the south through Hiran. After failing, they regrouped—crossing via a makeshift bridge near Oobaale, passing north of Mahaday, and sending fighters toward Adan Yabaal, which is now surrounded. A second column—made up of fighters besieged for nearly three years in Galguduud and Mudug—pushed south.

Sightings of al-Shabaab fighters in the Mogadishu suburb of Elasha Biyaha alarmed residents. But VOA journalist Harun Maruf, author of Inside Al-Shabaab, cautioned against panic. “To portray this as a fresh ‘advance’ toward Mogadishu is premature,” he said. “They’ve been ambushing reinforcements in this area for years—this is not new.”

Still, the risks are real. “Will al-Shabaab have more chances to smuggle VBIEDs into Mogadishu? Highly likely,” Maruf wrote on X. “Will they attempt a conventional battle for the capital? Highly unlikely.”

The campaign reached a crescendo on March 18 when militants detonated a massive bomb targeting President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s convoy. The following day, al-Shabaab fighters from the two flanks linked up in Guulane—marking their most significant operational consolidation in central Somalia in recent years.

Caleb Weiss has warned that recent developments in Middle Shabelle are alarming and could ultimately impact Mogadishu’s security.

In response, the United States has ramped up its air campaign. Under President Donald Trump, the Pentagon has relaxed engagement rules, giving field commanders more leeway to strike. On March 15, AFRICOM targeted Al-Shabaab fighters in Shabelle. Two weeks later, it hit Islamic State fighters sheltering in the Al Miskaad Mountains of Puntland.

The Trump administration has loosened the rules of engagement in Somalia, allowing commanders more autonomy to act on intelligence in real-time. The strategy is designed to weaken both al-Shabaab and the smaller but persistent Islamic State-Somalia (IS-S) affiliate.

Meanwhile, Türkiye—already Somalia’s closest ally—has deepened its role. Following the March assassination attempt, President Mohamud travelled to Ankara to secure further support. Türkiye pledged additional military aid, intelligence sharing, and equipment, including the deployment of up to 5,000 personnel from SADAT, a Turkish private military company closely aligned with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Türkiye already maintains Camp TURKSOM in Mogadishu, its largest overseas military base. The base, once focused on training Somali recruits, is now being retooled for something closer to war.

Despite international support, Somalia’s domestic security framework remains fragile. The African Union’s new peacekeeping mission, AUSSOM, launched in January 2025 to replace the previous AMISOM force, is already facing funding shortages and internal disagreements among contributing countries. Burundi has withdrawn from the mission over troop deployment disputes, further weakening its effectiveness.

Meanwhile, internal divisions between Somalia’s federal government and regional states, including Jubaland, have resulted in armed clashes. The 2024 memorandum of understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland—a region seeking independence from Somalia—has strained Ethiopian-Somali relations and complicated military coordination against al-Shabaab.

The government’s reliance on clan militias to counter al-Shabaab has also proven inconsistent. Ma’awisley, once heralded as a game-changer in 2022’s offensive, has turned inward. Rivalries and resentment over unpaid salaries have led to infighting, raising concerns about their long-term reliability as partners in counterterrorism operations.

Although under heavy UN sanctions, al-Shabaab maintains a well-oiled war economy. The group’s revenue streams include forced taxation, zakat collection, extortion, and trade in illicit goods such as charcoal, sugar, livestock, and heroin. It also receives funds through diaspora remittances and investments.

The report also highlights the alleged growing ties between al-Shabaab and Yemen’s Houthi rebels. According to the United Nations Monitoring Group, the Houthis have supplied al-Shabaab with weapons in exchange for increased Houthi piracy operations in Somali waters. Militant propaganda videos have shown fighters wielding Chinese-manufactured weapons, raising concerns about illicit arms flows despite international embargoes.

The Soufan Center concludes that the Somali government’s gains over the past three years are at serious risk without sustained and coordinated international support. While airstrikes and foreign troops provide critical assistance, the government’s inability to hold territory, resolve internal political disputes, and integrate its security forces remains a long-term vulnerability.

“Somalia’s security environment remains deeply unstable,” the report states. “If structural weaknesses are not addressed, groups like al-Shabaab will continue to exploit governance vacuums and push closer to the capital.”